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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to show the importance of history in influencing the structure of corporate
ownership in France. The strong concentration of family ownership in France is traced to historical
weaknesses in the money and capital markets that forced families to have recourse to self-financing.
The weaknesses in the money and capital markets were greatly influenced by two eighteenth century
financial traumas arising from John Law’s Mississippi System (1716-20) and the financing of the
French Revolution through the issue of the assignats in the 1790s.These financial traumas delayed
significantly the emergence of banks and the capital market. Further historical factors influencing
French corporate ownership were the changes in the inheritance law system at the start of the








    The  French  model  of  corporate  ownership  and  control  is  quite  distinct  from  the  Anglo-
American model. It has been described as an insider model because it contains a high degree of 
concentration of ownership, while the wider dispersion of ownership characterised by the U.K. 
and U.S. models has been termed an outsider model. Why are there such widely differing 
models between France, and, indeed, many Continental European countries, on the one hand, 
and the U.S. and the U.K., on the other?  La Porta, Lopez-De-Silvanes and Shleifer (1998) have 
advanced the view that ownership in capital markets is concentrated where there is an absence 
of strong investor protection embodied in the legal system and regulatory arrangements. La 
Porta et al. highlight the role of contemporary institutions but downplay, aside from legal 
developments, the role of historical factors in shaping the structure of capital markets. More 
recently La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) asserted that: 
Common law countries have the strongest protection of outside investors – both 
shareholders and creditors – whereas French civil law countries have the weakest 
protection. (2000, 8) 
Their explanation appears to be that the legal system and regulatory controls determine the 
structure of corporate ownership. The civil law system is perceived to be linked to a system of 
weaker control and protection for investors, ergo, it is natural to find a high degree of 
concentration of ownership in countries such as France because of investors trepidation about 
investing in a relatively unprotected investment environment. In a post Enron, Tyco, 
WorldCom world French jurists and financiers might be permitted a wry smile at the 
implication that the common law system is linked to a strong system of corporate control.
1  
      This paper emphasises the importance of history in the shaping of corporate ownership 
structures. The theme of this paper is that historical elements can produce profound shocks and 
deep after waves, the effects of which move through an economy for many generations 
fashioning the collective psyche of people in such a way as to present barriers to innovation and 
change. The financing of a corporation may arise in three ways: (1) bank borrowing; (2) 
borrowing from the capital market; (3) self-financing through the use of retained profits. 
Borrowing from the banking sector and the capital markets dilutes the ownership of a 
                                                 
1 By the end of December 2000 Enron had a market capitalization of over $60 billion and had been ranked, by 
Fortune Magazine as the most innovative large company in the United States. Its bankruptcy raises the issue 
of corporate governance in the U.S.  Healy and Palepu (2003) made the following observations: 
‘Despite what they call an elaborate corporate governance network, Enron was able to attract large sums of 
capital to fund a questionable business model, conceal its true performance through a series of accounting and 
financial manoeuvres and hype its stock to unsustainable levels.’   3
corporation. Self-financing, on the other hand, strengthens the concentration of ownership. In 
France over the last three hundred years historical factors have produced a weak capital and 
banking structure. Because of these weaknesses there has been, until relatively recently, a 
significant reliance on self-financing. Self-financing in turn implies that ownership remains 
concentrated in the hands of individuals and families.  
    Chart  1  outlines  some  of  the  most  significant historical factors that have influenced the 
structure of corporate ownership in France. The presentation starts with two major financial 
traumas in the eighteenth century. These were (1) the rise and collapse of John Law’s 
Mississippi System and (2) the hyperinflationary experience generated by the assignats during 
the French Revolution. It is contended that these financial traumas, reinforced in the nineteenth 
century through the collapses of the Crédit Mobilier and the Union Générale, produced a weak 
banking and capital market structure in France. Deprived of access to banks and capital markets 
entrepreneurs developed the tradition of reliance on self-financing. This self-financing led to 
high degrees of concentration of ownership in France. Chart 1 suggests that this self-financing 
tradition was reinforced by a further historical factor, namely the changes in the inheritance law 
introduced at the start of the nineteenth century by Napoleon. Primogeniture had been 
perceived by the revolutionaries as a system that had aided and abetted the survival and 
strength of the aristocracy. The new post-revolutionary regime, embodied in the Napoleonic 
code, destroyed the system of primogeniture and replaced it with one based on an equal 
allocation of property rights amongst all the children in the family. Younger children could no 
longer be disinherited. The property of the parents was deemed, in large part, to be the property 
of the children after the death of the former. Paradoxically, this element involves a legal 
dimension, but not the type of legal dimension that La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) envisaged. In 
the French civil law it is practically impossible to disinherit one’s offspring. Faced with the 
potential ‘idiot heir’ problem families have successfully used the grandes écoles system to 
provide educated new leaders of the next generation. Adept recourse to trusts (les indivisions) 
and insurance has enabled family wealth to be transferred from generation to generation, 
minimising in the process the burden of inheritance taxes. Add to this legal change favouring 
the rights of all the children, a type of cultural mentalité that each generation is just the 
temporary custodian of the family’s property (patrimoine) faced with the objective of passing it 
on in even better shape to the next generation, and one finds a different set of factors that 
helped shape the development of France’s corporate ownership structure.     4
   Chart 1 also incorporates a section dealing with state involvement in the economy.  The state 
has always been a major player in the French economy since the days of Jean Baptiste Colbert 
(1619-83), who, during his period as Controller General of Finances, provided a template for 
sizeable intervention by the state in the economy.  Further manifestations in the form of 
nineteenth century Saint-Simonianism and, later, socialism meant that France experienced 
bouts of nationalizations and privatizations that greatly influenced the balance between state 
and private sector ownership of French companies. Finally, the state’s approach to pension 
funding is believed to be an important  recent contributory factor to the ownership mix in that 
the pay-as-you-go system in France has led to relatively small pension fund/insurance 
involvement in the equity market.   
   These factors emphasising the historical factors that created the tradition of reliance on self-
financing, the legal and cultural mix inherent in property ownership and the state’s invovement 
in the market are presented as helping to explain, at least in part, the current structure of family 
corporate ownership in France. 
    This paper starts with an overview of the current situation relating to corporate ownership in 
France. From there it moves back to the past to show how the failures of the banking system  in 
1720 and the assignats experiment in the 1790s, along with the collapse of the stock market in 
1720, had deep effects on the emergence of the an efficient banking and capital market 
structure in France. It will be contended that reliance on the self-financing of corporations was 
a natural outcome of the difficulties of both the banking system and the capital market. The 
change in the inheritance laws at the turn of the nineteenth century will be shown to have been 
a further contributory factor in the embedding of the family in French corporate life. The 
pension system in France will be presented to explain the sluggish growth of institutional 
investment in French companies relative to their counterparts in the U.S. and U.K. in the 
second half of the twentieth century.  
    Finally, three examples of the growth of family controlled companies, car manufacturers 
Peugeot, cosmetic producer L’Oréal, and tyre manufacturers Michelin are presented to provide 
some support for the underlying themes of the paper. These companies also serve to counter 
Easterbrook’s (1997) view that ‘a high concentration of ownership is associated with lesser 
efficiency’. 
 
   5
The Current Corporate Ownership Structure in France      
 
    The ownership of companies in France has frequently been a very hot political issue. In the 
1930s the Prime Minister, Edouard Daladier, vehemently criticised the two hundred ‘grandes 
familles’ whom he contended controlled all aspects of French business life as well as the 
Banque de France, the stock exchange and the press. Daladier’s two hundred big families have 
been shown to be a myth (Anderson, 1965). Nevertheless, a wider range of families does 
exercise a highly significant part in the ownership of French companies. 
   Three salient features of France’s current corporate ownership structure are (1) concentration 
of ownership; (2) extensive family ownership; (3) the role of holding companies. Bloch and 
Kremp (2001) in their recent study of French companies have shown that ‘concentration of 
direct ownership and voting power is very high in France’. They found that ‘Around 40% of 
unlisted firms have, as first shareholder, individuals owning directly more than 50% of the 
capital. For the CAC 40 firms, individuals are not the largest blockholder, but when they 
effectively are present as blockholders, they hold around 30% of the voting rights and have the 
control in fact’ (Bloch and Kremp, 2001, 123). A recent French study by Allouche and Amann 
(1995) showed that, in 1992, 28.3% of the top 1,000 industrial companies were controlled by 
families (foreigners 23.5% and state 28.2%). Furthermore, when excluding the state and foreign 
owned companies from the analysis, families controlled 59% of the top 500 industrial 
companies, an increase of 10% on the 1982 statistics. Blondel, Rowell and Van der Heyden 
(2002) investigated the ownership structure of France’s 250 largest publicly traded companies 
for both 1993 and 1998. They show that 57% of the listed SBF 250 companies were 
patrimonial firms i.e. companies where individuals or families had an ownership stake 
exceeding 10%. Furthermore, confirming Allouche and Amann’s (1995) results they noted that, 
rather than being on the wane, patrimonial firms grew from 48% to 57% of the SBF 250 over 
the period 1993-98, Taking all firms listed on the French stock exchanges between 1994-2000, 
Sraer and Thesmar (2004) observed that approximately a third of the firms were widely held, 
another third were founder controlled and the remaining third were heir controlled family firms. 
Their results show that both founder controlled and heir controlled family firms largely 
outperformed widely held corporations. In December 2002 the business magazine, Le Nouvel 
Economiste, estimated that the five hundred richest families in France had a fortune of 106 
billion euro. Within this group the fifty richest families had assets of 72 billion euro and the ten 
richest had assets of 43 billion euro.     6
      Additionally, as distinct from the United States, where there has been a predominantly 
multidivisional corporate structure, there are many holding-company structures controlling 
large industrial groups in France. Lévy-Leboyer (1980) explained the development of these 
holding companies as arising from banking and capital market limitations: 
…financial constraints, particularly the inability of the banks and the capital markets to 
cope with businesses’ new requirements, finally brought into being large industrial 
groups tied together by financial holding companies. (1980, p. 629) 
 
 
History and Corporate Ownership – An Overview 
 
   History is revelatory in identifying many of the key factors that have produced the current 
corporate ownership structure in France. Analysing this historical evolution and development is 
a complex task. Those looking for some type of linear progression with newer institutions 
building on and evolving from older institutions may be disappointed for the last three hundred 
years embrace a wide range of diverging tendencies. There are many discontinuities. In this 
respect the history of corporate finance in France is quite distinct from that of the U.K. In the 
latter country political revolution, involving warring factions, had ended by the end of the 
seventeenth century and a significant part of the financial revolution had taken place by the 
third decade of the eighteenth century. In Britain one can see a type of linear progress as 
institutions built on institutions. Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries British banks 
and insurance companies became increasingly adept at channelling savings to investors. The 
stock exchange efficiently raised finance to fund the borrowing requirements of the Exchequer 
and to provide capital to the trading companies that were extending Britain’s imperial and 
colonial power. The political system hovered around the centre rarely oscillating excessively to 
the left. Additionally, and importantly, Britain was not invaded. 
   France was to have a more tumultuous three hundred year history. During the eighteenth 
century it was involved in a number of long and expensive wars (The War of the Spanish 
Succession, 1701-14; the War with Spain 1718-20; the War of the Polish Succession, 1733-38; 
the War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-48; the Seven Years’ War, 1756-63; the War for 
American Independence, 1778-1783; the wars that emerged from the Revolution 1792 to the 
start of the Napoleonic Wars). It possessed a monarchy until the revolution of 1789, followed 
by a revolutionary government until the arrival of Napoleon. From there political life   7
experienced the tumult of the restorations of the monarchy and of the Napoleonic dynasty. Add 
to these the siege of Paris by the Germans in 1870 and the commune in Paris when twenty to 
thirty thousand citizens were killed in a mini-civil war in 1871. The German invasion of 1870 
was the prelude to two further invasions during the two World Wars of the twentieth century. 
These political developments frequently meant that industrial developments had to play second 
fiddle to the political orchestrations of wars, civil wars and invasions. And yet, notwithstanding 
these developments on the home soil, France became one of the largest colonial powers of the 
last three centuries ruling sizeable tracts of land in Africa, North and South America and Asia.  
   Because France was frequently at war, both internally and externally, the political instability 
of the country was accompanied by financial instability. Wars and revolutions require 
financing. This financing in turn created significant state borrowing and debt. Perforce the 
banking system and the capital market were heavily tapped to provide finance for these wars. 
As a corollary to this the state’s heavy recourse to borrowing left substantially less available for 
the banks and the capital markets to provide to the private sector. The next two sections show 
the development of (1) the banking sector and (2) the capital market against this background of 
long periods of warfare. 
 
 
The Evolution of the French Banking System 
 
    This section highlights three elements in the early development of banking that cast a long 
shadow over France’s financial history. They are: (1) John Law’s Mississippi system; (2) the 
surrogate banking system provided by the French notaires; (3) the assignats experience during 
the French revolution.  It will then show the knock-on effects that these developments had for 
the banking system in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
   Renaissance Italy, seventeenth century Holland and Sweden, and, belatedly, England, with 
the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694, grew through the establishment and 
development of their respective banking systems. While the English banking system evolved 
and helped to finance the war against Louis XIV, the French banking system remained 
underdeveloped to the point that Louis XIV had to rely on the protestant Genevan based 
bankers – many of whom he had persecuted and forced out of France through the revocation of 
the Edict of Nantes - to finance a large part of his budgetary deficit.    8
   The death of Louis XIV essentially left France bankrupt creating an environment in which the 
Scottish born John Law (1671-1729) could present a new financial architecture aimed at (1) 
relieving the shortage of money through the establishment of a note issuing bank and (2) 
reducing the state’s indebtedness through the creation of a trading company which would have 
as one of its objectives the conversion of government securities into equity of the company. 
Both of these developments were to have a profound effect on banking and the capital markets 
in France. In the immediate short-term Law’s System would make France the most innovative 
country with respect to corporate financing and banking in Europe. In the long-term it would 
leave a deep hostility and mistrust towards banks and financial innovation. 
      The General Bank was established by Law in May 1716 – see Murphy (1997). It was 
modelled on the Bank of England in that it obtained its banking privileges from the state in 
return for taking up part of the national debt - part of the outstanding amount of short term 
billets d'état. The early success of the General Bank enabled Law to embark on the second 
aspect of his macroeconomic strategy, namely the management of the national debt. To do so 
he needed to create a trading company modelled on the lines of the British trading companies 
such as the East India Company and the South Sea Company. In August 1717 he established 
the Company of the West (Compagnie d'Occident), which was given monopoly-trading rights 
over French Louisiana - an area representing half of the landmass of the United States today 
(excluding Alaska). It acquired these trading rights in return for re-structuring, and accepting a 
lower interest rate, on part of the outstanding amount of billets d'état. The Company benefited 
in that it acquired rights to exploit the agricultural and mineral potential of this huge area. The 
state benefited in that part of its floating short-term debt was converted into long-term debt, 
which bore a lower rate of interest. Shareholders in the new company, who swapped billets 
d'état in return for the company's shares, had the prospect of large capital gains if the wealth of 
Louisiana was properly exploited. The nominal value of each share, which came to be known 
as mères, issued by the Company of the West was 500 livres, but, as they were purchased with 
billets d'état, then standing at a discount of over 70%, it meant that the initial shareholders 
purchased their shares at a price of around 150 to 170 livres. It took nearly two years for the 
shares to reach their nominal issue price of 500 livres. 
   Initially there was little interest in the Company and Law had difficulty in selling its shares. 
A year after its establishment Law started to use the Company of the West to mount a series of 
spectacular takeovers and mergers. At the same time he developed the General Bank by   9
ensuring that it was used as the government's bank for the receipt and disbursement of state 
funds.  
   In August 1718 the Company of the West acquired the lease of the tobacco farm, while in 
December it took over the Company of Senegal. In the same month the General Bank's 
operations were re-organised and it was re-named the Royal Bank. In May 1719 Law merged 
the enlarged Company of the West with the Company of the East Indies and China to form the 
Company of the Indies. Further acquisitions in the form of the Company of Africa and the lease 
of the Mint were made in June and July of that year. These acquisitions and mergers required 
financing. Law arranged this through the issue of two tranches of shares known as the filles, 
and petites filles. It has already been shown that the mères, issued in 1717 on the establishment 
of the Company of the West, were subscribed for in billets d'état, which were standing at a very 
sizeable discount, effectively costing the first shareholders only 150 livres. The second issue of 
shares, the filles, were issued in June 1719 at 550 livres. The share price jumped in July 
enabling Law to issue a further batch of shares, the petites filles, this time at l,000 livres each. 
   By the end of July 1719 Law's Company had issued 300,000 shares with a nominal value of 
150 million livres. As the share price had jumped from 150 livres in 1717 to over l,000 in July 
1719, the stage was set for  further leverage of Europe's first major stock market boom. This 
boom was linked to Law's wish to take-over France's national debt by swapping shares for 
government securities. The sheer magnitude of this operation proved to be breathtaking. 
    On August 26, 1719 the Regent presented Law's proposal for the Mississippi Company, as it 
was popularly known, to take over the tax farms and the remainder of the national debt. Law's 
plan was to lend the King 1.2 billion livres at an interest rate of 3% so as to repay the national 
debt. This money would be used to repay the long-term state debts, the annuities (rentes), the 
remaining short-term floating debt  (billets d'état), the cost of offices (charges) that had been or 
would be suppressed, and the shares of the tax farms. 
      Under the plan holders of government securities were forced to give up government 
securities, bearing a 5% rate of interest, while at the same time they were offered the possibility 
of acquiring shares of the Company yielding far less in terms of dividend but possessing the 
prospect of sizeable capital gains. With the share price jumping from 2,250 on August 1 to 
2,940 on August 14, to 5,000 and over in mid-September, capital gains rather than dividends 
occupied the minds of most transactors. By these measures Law proposed 'the radical cure' for 
the French economy. He aimed to transform the Company from a trading company to a trading-  10
cum-financial conglomerate, controlling the State's finances most notably tax collection and 
debt management.  
      The sharp price rose sharply during August. On August 1, 1719 the original shares, the 
mères, which, as has been shown, could have been bought for around 150 livres in 1717 stood 
at 2,750 livres. By August 30 they had risen to 4,100 and by September 4 they were at 5,000 
livres, with the filles and petites filles rising  pari-passu. The debt holders recognising the 
prospect of a capital gain were quite happy to transfer their debt into shares rather than bonds. 
They needed the prospect of an expected capital gain to compensate for the interest reduction 
on their securities from 4% to 3%. Their difficulty in fact became one of converting quickly 
enough into the shares of the Company as the price of the shares rose very sharply during 
September. 
   Within a three-week period in September/October the Company issued 324,000 shares, of 
which 300,000 were sold to the public at 5,000 livres a share, amounting in all to 1.5 billion 
livres. The Company had now started to operate in a different manner to that characterising its 
operations between August 1717 and August 1719 when it raised around 106 million through 
the first three share issues.  
   The shares reached a 1719 high of 10,000 on December 2. At this point the market valuation 
of the Mississippi Company was 6.24 billion livres. Concomitant with these developments the 
banknote issue of the Royal Bank had been increased from 160 million livres in June to l 
billion livres by the end of 1719 as money was lent to existing shareholders to purchase further 
shares. France was awash with liquidity, particularly after the Company guaranteed a floor 
price of 9,000 livres a share in early 1720 through the establishment of a buying and selling 
agency known as the 'bureau d'achat et de vente'. Effectively, the workings of this agency 
monetized shares.  
   In February 1720 the Royal Bank and the Company of the Indies were formally merged 
together. At this juncture, Law, who had been appointed Controller General of Finances, in 
January 1720, wrote: 
One sees here a sequence of ideas which are interlinked and which reveal more and 
more the principle on which they are based.  (Law, 1934, iii, 98-99) 
For a while the System, in all its unifying beauty, seemed to work. Economic activity boomed, 
the national debt appeared to be under control, money was plentiful and the interest rate had 
been driven down to 2%.   11
   Law had created a financial system the long-term viability of which was crucially dependent 
on the growth of the real economy. There had to be some equilibrium relationship between the 
financial system and the real economy. For a while a temporary equilibrium existed, as 
transactors seemed content to remain within the financial circuit trading money for shares, and 
shares for money. However, once money started spilling too quickly from the financial circuit 
into the real economy problems arose. The real economy proved to be incapable of generating a 
sufficient growth in commodities to match the monetary expansion so that the excess money 
created inflation and balance of payments problems. Law had always believed that the growth 
in the real economy, spurred on by monetary expansion, would be sufficient to mop up the 
newly created money. Indeed, in Money and Trade (1705) he went further and argued that 
monetary expansion would lead to a balance of payments surplus. For a period Law tried to 
lock transactors into the financial circuit by a series of measures ranging from prohibitions on 
the holding of more than 500 livres of specie or bullion, to the demonetization of gold and a 
phased monthly demonetization of silver. Temporarily these measures worked. But there was 
still too much liquidity in the System. On May 21, 1720 an arrêt was published stipulating that 
shares were to be reduced by four ninths (from 9,000 to 5,000) and banknotes by half (eg. a 
banknotes worth l0,000 livres to be reduced to 5,000 livres) between May and December. 
   This was an attempt to reduce the liquidity of the System thereby bringing the financial 
circuit back into line with the real economy. Despite the revocation of this May 21 arrêt a 
couple of days later - due to public pressure - the effect on confidence was so great that the 
System never recovered from it. The price of shares and banknotes fell continuously during the 
summer (ironically, at this point the shares in the South Sea were rising rapidly) and the 
autumn of 1720. Law was forced to flee the country, with the aid of the Regent, in December. 
    Law had shown that he was able to conceptualize and establish, if only for a short period, a 
modern non-metallic world at the start of the eighteenth century. He had shown, albeit for a 
brief three years period, the massive potential of the capital market and the way in which 
positive wealth effects from this market could drive the economy to greater growth. It would 
take economists and financial leaders another couple of centuries to produce for the global 
economy what Law had briefly achieved in France in France during 1719-20. Du Tot realised 
the full extent of this achievement:  
 In this state, this construction was admired by everyone in France and was the envy of 
our neighbours who were really alarmed by it. Its beauty even surpassed all the hopes 
that had been placed in it since it made people despise and refuse gold and silver. It was   12
a type of miracle which posterity will not believe. However, it is clear that there was a 
period, of many months, when no one wanted them [gold and silver]. (Du Tot, 1935, i, 
106) 
   The  failure  of  Law’s  System  produced  a  very strong reaction against banks, credit and 
financial innovation. It also heralded a retour en arrière for the French financial system to the 
old one dominated by religious directives controlling the methods of borrowing and lending 
and the state constituting the main borrower of funds through the creation of rentes (annuities). 
In this strange financial no man’s land where interest could not be explicitly charged, contracts 
had to be drawn up separating the ownership of savings from the streams of revenue it 
generated.  The notaires (notaries) were at the centre of this system. Indeed their role was so 
central, in the absence of traditional style bankers, that they became surrogate bankers. 
 
The Notaires as Bankers 
 
   The credit market in eighteenth century post-Lawian France cannot be interpreted as one in 
which there was a free flow of funds between surplus and deficit units with the rate of interest 
acting as an equilibrating factor in the allocation of funds.  
   The usury laws, allied with the failure of Law’s Royal Bank, created an environment in which 
the standard evolution of banking from goldsmiths to credit creating deposit banks did not take 
place in France in the eighteenth century. Between 1720 and the Revolution, aside from 
bankers who discounted bills of exchange – an important media of exchange for merchants 
much neglected by historians - and one or two scattered sightings of banks such as the short-
lived, Caisse d’Escompte, eighteenth century France existed without a formalised banking 
structure. While the Genevan based protestant bankers became major lenders to the government 
and big merchant companies, the question arises as to how the more mundane business of 
banking was carried out in the absence of clearly constituted banks in France during this 
century.  
      Recently Hoffman, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal (2001) have advanced the thesis that the 
French notarial system, in particular, the Parisian notaires, provided a sophisticated surrogate 
banking system. Because of the usury laws they were the intermediaries for every transaction 
embodying an implied rate of interest as they were the only agents who could notarise financial 
instruments in the form of obligations, rentes constitutuées and rentes viagères. The analysis of 
Hoffman et al.  shows that the notaires acted as bankers by intermediating as agents between   13
savers and borrowers. However, notwithstanding the pervasiveness of their intermediating 
activities, the notaires were for the most part only demi-bankers acting as a conduit for savers 
with surplus funds to borrowers, most notably the state. The notaires were usually not 
principals in these transactions nor did they did act as bankers in the sense of lending credit to 
some multiple of the funds deposited with them. Furthermore most of the lending activity that 
they arranged was of a long-term nature. Their banking role was narrowed down further in that 
most of the lending that they intermediated was to the government on a long term basis through 
the acquisition of rentes  or loans for the purchase of lands or property. Hoffman et al. 
(2001,361) admit in a footnote that the development of long term credit in both Britain and 
France initially was more beneficial for the public debt and the housing market than for 
industry and trade (2001, 361). Whatever about the validity of their reflection on the British 
situation, it is revealing in that it shows that French lending activity was concentrated in two 
sectors, the state and real estate. The rentier mentality – a natural successor to the earlier 
financier mentality - has deep roots in French history. 
   The thesis of Hoffman et al. is that the notaires provided a type of golden age in banking 
acting as highly efficient intermediaries between savers and borrowers. Their information base 
– they were able to pool and share information up to the early part of the nineteenth century - 
provided detailed knowledge on the assets of borrowers and whether they were encumbered or 
not. This information enabled them to provide high quality borrowers for savers with surplus 
funds. The utilisation of this information provided a stable background for lenders in which 
there was a low risk of default. This stability in turn generated confidence in the system and 
increased the number of lenders prepared to act through the notarial system. 
      An alternative interpretation is to view this surrogate banking system as costly, highly 
conservative and inefficient because of the additional complication that the usury laws 
prevented the rate of interest from allocating credit between savers and borrowers. The notaires 
operated a highly effective cartel. In 1659 there were 113 notaires in Paris. Despite the growth 
of Paris the number of notaires remained the same until they rose to 122 in 1859! The system 
was costly in that transactors were subject to notarial fees and excluded from the market if they 
did not have appropriate asset backing. The usury laws, which set a ceiling rate of interest of 
5%, effectively ensured that the notaires faced with excess demand for credit could filter out 
borrowers by the value of their asset collateral rather than the quality of the intended 
investment project. The system was conservative in that the vast bulk of lending was to the 
government and property sectors. Incipient industrialists would have found it practically   14
impossible to borrow through the notaires. Above all it must be pointed out that the notarial 
system was not a banking system in the sense of providing a flexible structure for the 
expansion of credit. All the notaires did was to increase the velocity of circulation of money by 
making it easier for some borrowers to access savers. However, they were not principals in the 
financial transactions and were in no way capable of lending money against reserves deposited 
with them.  
 
The Assignats Experiment 
 
    The revolutionaries were quick to recognise the strait-jacket of the Ancien Régime’s financial 
system. In October 1789 they repealed the legislation that criminalized the stipulation of a rate 
of interest on a contract. In July 1796 they abolished the ceiling rate of interest. Between these 
two dates they set up a paper money system. The revolutionaries, copying in many respects 
Law’s earlier theoretical plans for a land bank in Scotland, financed the early stages of the 
revolution through the issue of the assignats, a paper money initially assigned, or, 
collateralized, by confiscated ecclesiastical property. When first issued through a decree of 
December 19, 1789, the assignats bore a rate of interest of five per cent. The interest payments 
were quickly stopped and the assignats were transformed into fiat money in 1790. The creation 
of the assignats produced heated debate in the French Assembly with partisans of the System 
maintaining that they were not inflationary financial instruments because they were fully 
backed by the confiscated ecclesiastical property. Other parliamentarians tellingly reminded 
their listeners of Law and his System. Though seventy years had elapsed between the end of 
Law’s System and the Revolution, the memories of Law’s attempted financial revolution were 
still fresh in the minds of those sitting in the Assembly. Indeed, John Law was the most cited 
economist in the debates that took place in the Assembly on the assignats. In September 1790,  
the Abbé Maury held up a fistful of banknotes in the Assembly remarking: 
Alas! At this moment I hold in my trembling hands many of Law’s banknotes, these 
fictive pledges of an immense and illusory capital, which I drew from a huge depot 
where they have been held for the instruction of posterity. With sorrow I look at these 
paper instruments of so many crimes, I see them still covered with the tears and blood 
of our fathers and I offer them today to the representatives of the French nation as 
beacons placed on the reefs so as to perpetuate the memory of this massive shipwreck. 
(Archives Parlementaires, vol. 19, September 28, 1790, 300)       15
   Maury’s melodramatic warning words were not accepted. The assignats were much needed to 
finance the early stages of the Revolution with Harris contending that they kept fourteen armies 
in the field (1930, 53). They were first issued on April 1, 1790 for a total of 400 million. By 
September 1792 they had risen to 2.7 billion and a year later that were over 5 billion. By March 
1795 they had reached 8 billion rising to 20 billion in the same year. When they were 
eventually taken out of circulation in 1796 45.6 billion had been issued of which 32.8 billion 
were still in circulation (Lafaurie, 1981, 169). The over-issue of assignats led to massive 
hyperinflation. Taking a price index of 100 in January 1791, White (1989) showed that it rose 
to 30,411 by March 1796! Kindleberger concluded that the assignats ‘…embedded paranoia 
about paper money and banks more deeply in the French subconscious, and helped establish 
Napoleon successively as consul and emperor.’ (1984, 99) 
   It was not until 1800 that a quasi-central bank, the Banque de France was established and 
even here the primary reason for its establishment was to lend money to Napoleon’s 
government. Additionally, jealous of its monopoly issuing powers, the Banque de France spent 
its first fifty years trying to block the creation of other banks. The massive difference in 
progress between the British and French banking systems may be seen by reading Henry 
Thornton’s An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (1802) 
on the role of the paper credit system in Britain. Thornton, a professional banker, attacked 
Adam Smith for his lack of understanding of the extent to which banknotes and bank credit had 
become central to the financing of the British economy. He showed the sophisticated layers of 
different types of paper credit that had been introduced in Britain to finance economic activity 
and the central role of the Bank of England in the provision of credit. The London banks 
depended on the Bank of England and the country banks in turn depended on the London 
banks. Furthermore, Thornton showed the ways in which the Bank of England could improve 
its function as a lender of last resort to the banking system. Thornton’s analysis demonstrated 
that Great Britain had a far more sophisticated banking system than that of France with the 
Bank of England acting as a quasi Central Bank, all this at the very time that the Banque de 
France had just been established! 
   The hyper-inflationary experience of the assignats, reinforcing the earlier collapse of Law’s 
System, strengthened a strong anti-banking and financial innovation view in France. It 
intensified the French public’s bas de laine mentality i.e the hoarding of gold and silver in 
woollen socks underneath the mattress. Not only did the French hoard gold and silver, but, they 
also used specie as the main medium of exchange for most of the nineteenth century. This   16
strong preference for specie meant that it constituted 95% of the money supply in 1803, 82% in 
1845, and 68% in 1870. By 1885 it still amounted to over 52% of the money supply (Cameron, 
1967, 116). Flandreau (2004) has recently shown that, notwithstanding the growth of banking 
in  the north-eastern half of France in the 1850s, specie holding greatly increased across the 
country in that decade due to a combination of factors – the growth in farm incomes, the 
absence of a banking network in country areas and the inflow of new supplies of gold from the 
Californian Gold Rush. The French love of gold continued through to recent times as evidenced 
by the reporting of the daily price of small gold bars (les lingots) and gold coin (le Napoleon) 
alongside news of stock price movements on radio and television. 
      The vesting of significant monopoly powers in the Banque de France, along with the 
extensive use of specie as a circulating medium, meant that the banking system remained 
underdeveloped for the first half of the nineteenth century. This view runs counter to that 
developed by Lévy-Leboyer in Les Banques européennes et l’industrialisation internationale 
dans la première moitié du XIX siècle (1964). In this work Lévy-Leboyer concluded that, 
contrary to conventional opinion, the banking system was highly effective and that by 1843 
‘the financial market gave the impression of having become the living part of the economy’ 
(1964, 699). However, a couple of pages later, Lévy-Leboyer equivocated with respect to this 
strong conclusion admitting that, aside from Paris, it was financial centres outside France, 
based in Geneva and Basle, that provided banking facilities for the merchants of Lyons and 
Mulhouse.  Lévy-Leboyer  equivocated further by admitting that: 
  It should not be forgotten that, in many regions, credit was unheard of: in the 
countryside, the usage of banknotes continued to be unknown; in the manufacturing 
towns bills of exchange were continually used for ordinary transactions, and in most 
cases, even in Alsace, those wishing to borrow money were obliged to go to the 
notaires (there were nearly 10,000 in France in 1840) or to less recommended business 
agents (1964, 705).  
This latter description, showing the continued use of notaires, does not suggest that there was a 
highly effective banking system in France at the time. 
   There were still considerable constraints preventing the emergence of a proper credit based 
banking system. How could a paper based media of exchange system emerge when, up to 1847, 
the smallest denomination note of the Banque de France was 500 francs? This, as Cameron 
(1967, 117) has pointed out, was greater than the annual per capita income in France at the 
time. How could a credit creating banking system thrive when the currency (i.e. gold and silver   17
coins) to deposits ratio was so high? Furthermore the Banque de France systematically blocked 
the emergence of other banks in order to maintain its monopoly banking powers. It was not 
until 1848 that legislation was introduced to charter joint-stock banks. The change in legislation 
enabled the Pereire brothers to establish the Crédit Mobilier in 1852 and in that same year the 
Crédit Foncier, which in turn established the Crédit Agricole and the Comptoir de l’Agriculture 
as subsidiaries, started business. In 1859 the Crédit Industriel et Commercial was created while 
in 1863/64 the Crédit Lyonnais and the Société Générale were established.  Notwithstanding 
the creation of these banks, cheques were not legally recognized until 1865 and the public still 
had a strong bias in favour of specie. Cameron concluded on the French banking system up to 
1870: 
Comparisons with English and Scottish data reveals that the complaints of French 
businessmen were justified: bank facilities were too few, and bank resources pitifully 
inadequate. At the end of its ‘take-off’ period the French economy had approximately 
the same bank density as Scotland had had in the middle of the eighteenth century. 
France had fewer bank assets per inhabitant in the mid-nineteenth century than 
England or Scotland had had in 1770 and in 1870 had not reached the position that 
they had held before the beginning of the nineteenth century’ (1967, 110) 
   Furthermore it continued like this with specie still constituting the preferential form of money 
up to World War 1. By 1913, despite the expansion of bank deposits from 17.2% in 1880 to 
44.3% of M1 defined as coin, banknotes and bank deposits, they still constituted only a small 
part of the overall money supply. In the U.S. and U.K. bank deposits represented about 88% of 
M1 at this point in time. This conservatism with respect to deposit creation had its counterpart 
in the area of credit expansion.  
   Gueslin observed that between the 1880s and 1930s companies had to rely on self-financing 
rather than bank credit ‘…banking credit remained more or less limited and the financing of the 
economy came about through the accumulation of savings: primarily as companies directly 
used parts of their cash flow, but also by the transfer of domestic savings via the financial 
market’ (1992, 63). This meant that the banking sector, despite its expansion in the middle part 
of the nineteenth century, continued to play a predominantly conservative role in the extension 
of credit to the industrial sector. 
   Between the two World Wars the relative imbalance between the development of banks in 
France and in Great Britain and the U.S. was very great. One indicator of this was the size of 
bank deposits per head of the population. Gueslin noted that in 1937 per capita bank deposits   18
amounted to 1,700 francs in France as against 12,000 francs per inhabitant in the U.S. and 
10,100 francs in the U.K.  
The apparent backwardness of France can be explained by the lesser importance there 
of bank deposits, the existence of channels for financial savings, the competition of the 
savings banks …and by the probable existence of hoarding, reflecting the still 
essentially rural nature of the country (Gueslin, 1992, 87). 
   In Gueslin’s view ‘It was only after 1966, and not without difficulty, that the commercial 
banks of France were really able to flourish’. The road, from John Law’s Royal Bank in 1720 
to an efficient commercial banking system in France in 1966, had been a long one.  
 
Capital Market Developments 
 
      As has been shown, over-borrowing by Louis XIV left France effectively bankrupt and 
created the conditions for John Law to embark on the most dramatic macroeconomic and 
corporate financing experiments of the eighteenth century. The apparent success of his 
Mississippi System showed the potential for an economy to operate without metallic money 
and to innovate with respect to re-structuring the national debt. Fears that Law had discovered 
the Philosopher’s Stone led the British to follow suit and use the South Sea Company to re-
structure the public debt. The strong anti-banking mentality that arose from the collapse of the 
Royal Bank in 1720 was accompanied by a strong official reaction to joint stock companies. 
Again the events of 1720 were central to this reaction. Ironically, in a bid to corner the market 
for loanable funds, the South Sea Company pressurised the British government to introduce the 
Bubble Act of 1720. The Act nullified bubble companies that had been established without 
joint stock charters from Parliament. It backfired in the face of the South Sea Company, for, in 
precipitating a collapse of the smaller bubble companies, it forced holders of such fallen stock 
to sell South Sea in order to pay for these losses. These sales in turn caused the price of the 
South Sea Company to collapse. The far greater consequence of the Bubble Act was that it 
effectively prevented most British companies from obtaining joint-stock charters for more than 
a century. This remained the situation in Britain until the repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825 and 
the introduction of the Companies Act – popularly known as the Limited Liability Acts – in 
1862. 
   It was a similar, if not longer, story in France. From 1721 onwards, due to the collapse of 
Law’s Mississippi Company, it was particularly difficult for companies to obtain full limited   19
liability status. Investors, wishing to form joint stock companies, could only do so by acquiring 
permission from the government and undergoing a cumbersome process of establishing their 
charters through complicated legal procedures. Through the eighteenth and the first half of the 
nineteenth century French jurisprudence confined, all but a restricted number of companies in 
areas such as insurance and transportation, to two legal structures: 
(1) Simple partnerships (Sociétés en nom collectif) 
(2) Limited partnerships (Sociétés en commandite) 
   In the simple partnerships all partners were equally liable for the firm’s debts. In the case of 
the limited partnerships the ‘sleeping partner’ (the commandite) who subscribed the capital 
only risked the amount that he subscribed, whereas the active partner or partners assumed 
unlimited liability. For example, the Irish born economist Richard Cantillon, who made a 
fortune out of the Mississippi System, ensured that he was the ‘sleeping partner’ in his bank in 
1718-1720 so that his liability was limited to the capital that he subscribed. (Murphy, 1986) 
      The simple and limited partnerships were unsatisfactory corporate structures for the 
development of large sized companies. Many owners and managers did not want to face the 
problem of unlimited liability. Additionally, there were very high transaction costs for partners 
wishing to withdraw their capital. Say and Chailley summarised the problems with this system:  
This was really a deplorable system because of the slowness that it entailed in the 
establishment of companies, because of its arbitrariness, and because, in the case of 
bankruptcy, shareholders blamed the government, and, believed themselves entitled to 
demand it to compensate them for their losses (1892, ii, 887). 
    Lévy-Leboyer noted that the Council of State, to which companies had to submit their plans 
for going public, instead of helping the formation of share issuing companies ‘…continually 
looked for ways of increasing its own powers without regard for the companies that it 
discredited nor for the economy the expansion of which it braked’ (1964, 702). 
   Cameron contended that ‘the depression of 1857 revealed the undesirability of excessive 
reliance on the commandite form of organization for large-scale industry and commerce’ (1967, 
109). The Council of State started to liberalize its approach to company incorporation. The 
change in the British legislation in 1862, along with the incipient financing needs of the newly 
created railroads, further increased the pressure to change which started in 1863 and continued 
through the introduction of the Limited Liability Acts (Loi sur les sociétés) on July 24, 1867. 
This Act ensured that companies could be established freely under a limited liability charter 
without having to seek the formal and costly authorisation of the Council of State. The new act   20
encouraged the growth of limited liability companies, but, the ability of these companies to tap 
the capital market was constrained. Aside from the railway companies, domestic French 
companies had difficulties in initially attracting French investors. Lévy-Leboyer has focused 
attention on the relative immaturity of capital markets in France as against those of the U.S. and 
U.K. in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century.  
This lack of maturity prevented mergers developing to produce growth in the industrial sector. 
He observed: 
Before 1913 and during World War 1, the volume of security issues and the number of 
mergers remained rather low-probably because of a widespread prejudice against 
industrial shares and the lack of experience in marketing these securities on the part of 
banks and brokerage houses, which had previously dealt primarily in railroad bonds, 
public utilities and foreign securities. (1980, 600) 
   In pre-World War I France there was a tendency on the part of French people to invest in 
government bonds or foreign securities rather than in equities. A German remarked at the time 
‘If they do not succeed in changing the attitudes of the higher classes of the population, then 
nothing will stop France from becoming a nation of rentiers. The organization of her banking 
system is well designed to produce such an outcome’ (Gueslin, 1992, 72). Pollard (1985) has 
shown that in 1870 over a third of French domestic savings were invested abroad and by 1910 
this figure had risen to over 50%. The oral tradition in France provides many stories of 
ancestors who lost fortunes in railway shares and loans to Russia and other eastern European 
countries. Trunks full of these useless shares and bonds are to be found in family attics and in 
junk shops.  
        Bonin, writing of the Belle Epoque period from 1895-1914, noted that the majority of 
companies ‘…remained hostile to external capital, to increases of capital, to borrowing and to 
the banks. Self-financing dominated (two thirds in 1913) due to profits, the quick amortization 
of capital expenditure, financial reserves and a treasury the abundance of which was revealed 
by the expansion of bank deposits’  (1988, 40). Using Teneul and Lévy-Leboyer’s estimates 
Gueslin concluded that’…even if there were some exceptions, most investment on the eve of 
the First World War did come from undistributed profits’. (1992, 81) So self-financing was the 
norm for French companies. Notwithstanding Gueslin’s conclusion Rajan and Zingalese (2001) 
have recently presented statistics indicating that, on the eve of World War 1, France had a 
relatively high stock market capitalisation/GDP ratio of .78, double that of the U.S. (.39) and 
not too far from that of the U.K. (1.09). However, this statistic appears to be very much an   21
outlier as the stock market /GDP capitalisation statistics for the rest of the twentieth century 
produced by Rajan and Zingalese (2001: 61) show: 
 
Year      French Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP 
1939      0.19 
1950      0.08 
1960      0.28 
1970      0.16 
1980      0.09 
1990      0.24 
1999      1.17 
 
   So, while it appears that the French briefly flirted with the stock market in the first decade of 
the twentieth century, this flirtation, unlike the U.S. and the U.K., did not persist through the 
twentieth century. The statistics for 1999, most probably reflecting the privatisations of major 
French companies in the 1980s and the rise in their market value in the 1990s, show some 
revival of interest.  
 
Conclusion on Historical Elements influencing Corporate Ownership 
 
   By this stage some the main themes of this paper have started to emerge. For a great part of 
its three hundred year history since the rise and fall of John Law’s Mississippi System, France 
has been underbanked and has had a weak capital market. Unlike Great Britain, where the Bank 
of England was not brought down by the fall of the South Sea Company, the stock market crash 
of  l720 involved the complete destruction of the Royal Bank’s banknotes and confidence in the 
banking system. The collapse of the fiat money system created considerable hostility to banks, 
credit and financial innovation. This anti-banking mentality was later exemplified in Turgot’s 
magnum opus, Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution de la richesse (Reflections on the 
Formation and the Distribution of Wealth), first published in 1769/70. In the Réflexions Turgot 
introduced the concept of capital into economics for the first time and showed the link between 
savings and investment in the generation of economic growth. The work was to have a 
profound influence on the theory of capital formation in the 19
th century. Yet, for all its 
brilliance, Turgot missed out because his analysis on the process of capital formation was   22
confined to the time warp of eighteenth-century France, an economy in which banks did not 
exist and in which the capital market was the exclusive preserve of the government. Turgot 
maintained that savings financed investment and that savings were generated by abstention 
from consumption expenditure. He saw no role for the banking system in this process of capital 
formation. There is no mention of the words bank or credit in the Réflexions! Thus, we are left 
with the paradox that one of the outstanding economic works on capital formation has only a 
very elementary link with modern works on corporate finance because it is based exclusively 
on an internal financing model. 
   Turgot’s strong antipathy towards banks, which started, when, as a young seminarian at the 
Sorbonne, he pilloried John Law and his System (1749 [1913, I]), was symptomatic of 
eighteenth-century French attitudes towards money, banks, credit and financial innovation. Add 
to this antipathy, the hyperinflationary experience created by the assignats, and the French 
public’s desire to use specie rather than money created by banks becomes clearer. The heavy 
reliance on specie as a medium of exchange made it difficult for banks to emerge. In turn their 
ability to expand credit was limited by their difficulties in building up sufficient reserves of 
specie to create deposits. This view ties in with that of Kindleberger who maintained that 
‘…France lagged behind Britain in financial institutions and experience by a hundred years or 
so…” ((1984: 113). This is not to say that there were no banks operating in France in the first 
half of the nineteenth century but that their influence was relatively weak. Even the ‘haute 
banque’ which started to pioneer the art of merchant banking in the early part of the nineteenth 
century was so ‘haute’ that it did not cater for most of the emerging industrial sectors. It 
concentrated on investments in the railways, real estate, public works (roads, bridges, canals) 
and insurance. The Crédit Mobilier, a bank established by the Pereire brothers in 1852, was an 
attempt to find more broadly based support from stock market investors. It competed with the 
‘haute banque’ by investing in public works and railways not only in France but across the 
European continent. Its collapse in 1867 along with the later collapse of the Union Générale, 
which lasted a mere four years from 1878-1882,  reinforced French attitudes on the riskiness of 
banks. 
    Meanwhile  the  stock  market,  aside  from financing the government, had difficulties in 
generating equity issues because of the legal restraints that prevented the creation of limited 
liability companies up to 1867. Even after this companies did not use the capital market 
intensively. A great deal of the later nineteenth century French investment in the stock market 
was in railway stocks and foreign investments.    23
      A second historical element that is important in the French case relates to the role of 
inheritance law. Napoleon, when he introduced the Code Civil, moved the inheritance system 
from one based on primogeniture to a new system based on equal rights for all the children in a 
family. This change is important to note in that, unlike the U.S. and the U.K., where a testator 
can leave his/her estate to a charitable foundation this is not possible in France. The children 
are stakeholders in the parents’ estate. So, almost by definition, the family, due to the 
inheritance laws, becomes a major player in the ownership of French corporations. The only 
way to keep the family out of the corporation is to sell the company prior to death and spend 
the proceeds. As the French have lived through three German invasions in the last one hundred 
and forty years, few of them are inclined to spend all of their wealth on current consumption 
because of the fear that they may face the days of the 'vaches maigres' prior to death. 
Furthermore, in order to prevent the state appropriating the family estate through death duties, 
parents frequently transfer assets from the older to the younger generation via trusts (les 
indivisions) that give the parents the usufruits of the assets while bestowing on the children the 
nominal ownership of these assets. Thus, at the death of the patriarch or matriarch, there is only 
a small part of the estate that may be subject to death duties. Additionally, a change in the 
inheritance laws in 1905 stipulated that estate duties would only be payable on the net rather 
than the gross estate. This sent out a clear signal to the owners of wealth to shift from equity 
financing to loan financing because the latter could be used to offset their gross wealth position 
whereas the former method would add to overall tax liabilities for their offspring. The French 
are also very adept at using insurance policies on the lives of the older generation to provide tax 
free money to cover any death duties that may arise on the estate at inheritance.  Combine these 
elements with a different cultural approach which sees property as part of the 'patrimoine' and 
that the perceived obligation of property holders is to pass on the 'patrimoine' in a better state to 
future generations the reason why there is a high degree of concentration of ownership of 
corporations by families in the French model may be understood. Against such a background, it 
is not surprising to find family ownership, often concealed through a wide network of holding 
companies, exercising such a significant role in France’s corporate ownership structure.  
   Finding companies that span the three hundred years that we are investigating which might fit 
this particular historical template is a difficult task. It is the nature of companies to rise or fall, 
to be taken over or merged. Few remain in the same direct ownership over a prolonged period 
of time. One company that remained in the same family ownership for the period investigated 
was the printing and publishing company, Didot, which later became Firmin-Didot. Founded in   24
1698 it remained in business for three hundred years. It was a major book publisher, it was the 
company that printed the assignats during the Revolution, and it was a publishing house always 
to the fore in the area of printing technology – it was the first to introduce, for example, the 
Stanhope press in France in 1818 (Jammes, 1998). Throughout its long history the predominant 
form of financing for Didot was through the use of retained profits. Even when it issued shares 
it was only to family members for the purpose of facilitating the transfer of ownership from one 
generation to another. Blondel and Van der Heyden (1999) examined another family with a 
long history of corporate ownership, that of the Wendel family, involved in iron and steel 
production, which was founded in 1704.  
      Three companies with a strong family involvement and a corporate history spanning a 
hundred years or more have been selected to show the importance of self-financing in the 
evolution of their corporate histories. Each of these companies started with simple products, a 
rubber ball, a hair dye and a pepper mill. From these simple origins they developed into global 
companies in which descendants of the founders still have very sizeable holdings and 
representation in the management and direction of the companies. The companies are Michelin, 
L’Oréal, and Peugeot (PSA Peugeot Citroen). A sample of three does not prove the thesis of 
this paper. However, it is believed that these three companies are illustrative of a trend in 
French corporate life where family ownership is still so strongly embedded. They are also three 
of the most powerful and profitable French companies, employing a total of three hundred and 
seventy thousand workers.  
   Because they have been family owned and controlled companies it is difficult to penetrate 
into the decision making of these companies. Families are discreet and, in many cases, reluctant 
to open their archives to the public. An alternative method is to side-tunnel into the activities of 
these companies by examining the archives maintained on them by one of their bankers, the 
Crédit Lyonnais. These archives show the assessments of this bank’s financial analysts towards 
these companies over a long period of time. They constitute an invaluable, and much under-
utilised, source into decision making across all sectors of corporate France over the last one 
hundred and fifty years. Loubet (1999) has edited a range of archival extracts specifically 
related to the links between the automobile industry and the bank.  
 
 




   Michelin is Europe’s biggest manufacturer of tyres. It employs around 128,000 workers who 
produced sales of 15.7 billion euro in 2002. The history of Michelin traces back to 1829 when a 
young Scotswoman, Elizabeth Pugh Barker, a niece of the Scottish scientist Charles Macintosh, 
married Edouard Daubrée. The new Madame Daubrée used the vulcanised rubber solution, 
discovered by her uncle, to make playing balls for her children. The use of rubber in this way 
attracted the attention of two of her husband’s cousins, Aristide Barbier and Nicolas Edouard 
Daubrée. In 1832 they established a small factory using vulcanized rubber products for the 
manufacture of seals, belts, valves and pipes that could be used in agricultural machinery. In 
1889 André and Edouard Michelin took over their grandfather, Aristide Barbier’s agricultural 
equipment business. Edouard Michelin diversified the business into the manufacture of tyres 
and managed the company for the next fifty years. He was assisted by his brother, André, a 
marketing genius, who promoted the company in its early days via schemes such as the 
sponsorship of motor car races where the entrants were obliged to use Michelin tyres, the 
identification of these tyres with Monsieur Bibendum, a caricature of a rotund man made of 
tyres, and through the creation of the Michelin Guide Rouge, a publication that later developed 
into a gastronomic guide with its use of the star rating system for restaurants. The combination 
of Edouard’s managerial and engineering skills along with André’s marketing flair enabled 
Michelin to develop from a small-scale artisan enterprise to becoming an international tyre 
manufacturer.  By the time of Edouard’s death  in 1940 he had built Michelin into a company 
employing 25,000 employees. Today the Michelin family is estimated to own 25 per cent of the 
company and its wealth in 2002, has been estimated at 1.1 billion euro. 
   How has the Michelin family kept such a sizeable amount of the ownership of the company? 
The first point to note about Michelin is its rather unusual corporate status in that it is still a 
partnership (commandite) but with the capacity to issue shares. Because of its partnership status 
the Michelin family members who are involved in this partnership are liable for the company’s 
debts in the case of a bankruptcy. On the other hand the partnership gives the family control 
over the company. The family has been able to maintain this position through reliance on self-
financing. From its very inception self-financing appears to have been the mot d’ordre of the 
Michelin family. When Edouard assumed control of the company in 1886, he turned to the 
family rather than to the banks in order to provide the much-needed finance for new capital   26
expenditure. He went to his aunt, Emilie Mage, and asked her if she could lend the company a 
sizeable sum of money, the equivalent of 1.3 million euro. She asked Edouard to wait for a day. 
Then, having clarified with some nuns, the Petites Soeurs des Pauvres, that they would offer 
her a room in their convent, if she became destitute due to the non-payment of her loan, she lent 
Edouard Michelin the money which helped turn the company around (Lottman, 1998). Family 
ties can run deep at moments of crisis! 
   The nature of Michelin’s business was transformed as it moved into the manufacture of tyres 
for automobiles. Keeping up production with the growth of the automobile market meant that 
the company had considerable financing requirements. The family met these financing 
requirements by ploughing back retained profits into capital expenditure. When these profits 
were insufficient to meet their capital requirements they resorted to long-term bond issues. This 
in turn caused problems for their bankers because of their limited access to information on the 
company’s balance sheet. In 1930 when Michelin was seeking a loan of 200 million francs the 
analysts of the Crédit Lyonnais attempted to uncover the financial situation of the company so 
as to determine whether the bank would provide some of the capital required.  It is obvious 
from reading the analysts’ report of May 1930 that it was difficult determining the profitability 
of the company, which, because of its partnership status, was not obliged to publish any public 
accounts. The analyst did provide the following for the period 1925-28: 
 
End year   Profits  Distributed    Amounts put aside in Reserves 
Francs millions 
1925     29     29 
1926        31                          126 
1927     58     58 
1928     60     60 
 
Assuming that the banking analyst had access to part of the company’s accounts – although he 
did state that he did not know how this ‘réglement de l’exercice’ had been compiled - the above 
statistics show that Michelin appeared to have had a policy of retaining a very significant 
amount of its profits. The retention rate amounted to 50% of its profits in the years 1925, 1927 
and 1929. In 1926, on the back of very significant growth, it retained 126 million francs of its 
profits, over four times the amount it retained in 1925.  The analyst concluded that ‘the   27
development of the business has been made almost exclusively by recourse to retained profits 
and the management appears to be very prudent’. (CL 4908/3, May 1930, p. 7) 
   By this stage Michelin, still a family business (‘une affaire de famille’) had become the 
dominant manufacturer of tyres in France – its main factory at Clermont-Ferrand was 
producing 4 to 5 million tyres annually - and it was exporting more tyres than its competitors in 
the United States.  
   In 1930 it was successful in borrowing 300 million francs at 4.5% repayable from 1931 to 
1960. In 1946, with its main factory at Clermont-Ferrand badly damaged by Allied bombing, 
Michelin went back to the banks with a request to borrow 500 million francs. The banking 
analysts threw their hands in the air in trying to make sense of the accounts provided The 
‘réglement de l’exercise’ which had shown results of as high as 126 million francs in 1927 had 
dropped to 6 million in 1934 and then risen to a high of 40 million in 1939! Because of the lack 
of knowledge on the distributions of profits to the shareholders and the management the 
balance sheet was impossible to decipher properly. 
    The extent of Michelin’s recourse to self-financing may be seen from a further report by the 
Crédit Lyonnais in 1959 when Michelin was contemplating an issue of bonds to help finance its 
long term investment. The investment programme envisaged expenditure between 1958 and 
1963 of  55.4 billion old francs. Of this sum 75% was to be met by self-financing. 
   Again, in 1972, when Michelin decided to expand its North American plants to produce 
radial tyres, $250 million of the $400 million investment came from their reserves while the 
other $150 million came from a group of New York based banks (Lottman, 1998, 403). 
   The second key factor in maintaining the Michelin family’s control over the company was 
through the use of dual-class shares. Control of the company was kept in the family through the 
use of the partnership’s shares and strict rules as to who could hold these shares. In 1928 these 
rules stipulated how shares would be kept in the family: 
…they [holders’ shares] may be passed on to descendants or their relations up to the 
fourth degree [of consanguinity] or to someone who is already a shareholder. In all 
other cases the transfer is subordinate to the agreement of the Inspection Board and its 
managers, and, in default of this agreement, to the right of preemption that is formally 
reserved to the other shareholders. (CL, 4908/3, Mai, 1930) 
With respect to the ordinary shares of the company the articles of association stipulate that 
shares held for more than four years by residents of a country within the European Union have 




   L’Oréal, one of the leading fashion and cosmetics manufacturers in the world, was listed by 
the Wall Street Journal as the seventy first largest global public company ranked by market 
value ($47 billion) at the end of August 2003.  In 2002 with a labour force of nearly 50,000 it 
had sales of $15 billion. The origins of L’Oréal trace back to 1909 when a simple partnership 
trading as Schueller and Spery was established to sell a newly created synthetic product for 
dyeing hair. Eugène Schueller, a chemist by training, manufactured the hairdye in his home and 
sold it under the brand name Auréole. The name of the company summed up its activities, the 
French Company for the Harmless Dyeing of Hair (La Société Française de Teintures 
Inoffensives pour Cheveux). Starting with a capital of 135,000 francs it was transformed into a 
limited liability company (société anonyme) in 1939 by a merger with Foncière Driant under 
the name Société l’Oréal. The new company had a capital of 7 million francs. In 1950 it 
merged with Monsavon, a company that it would later sell to Procter and Gamble. In 1953 its 
turnover was 60 million francs with net profits of 1.85 million. Over the next fifty years it grew 
at a very fast pace so that by 2002 it had net profits of 1.2 billion euros. This performance has 
made it one of the outstanding shares on the French stock exchange.   
    With such a sizeable growth it might be natural to expect a wide diffusion of ownership of 
the shares of the company.  This is not the case with closely held shares accounting for 352 
million of the 655 million shares outstanding. Its founder, Eugène Schueller, and more recently 
his daughter, Ms. Liliane Bettencourt, since the death of her father in 1957, have been the 
major shareholders. In 1967 analysts at the Crédit Lyonnais estimated that Madame Bettencourt 
owned over 50% of the capital of the company (CL Etude 9011/4, February 9, 1967) at a time 
when its turnover amounted to about 295 million francs and its market capitalisation was 528 
million francs. In 1974 she sold nearly half of her L’Oréal stock to the Swiss multi-national 
Nestlé, combining with the latter to establish a French holding company, Gesparal which owns 
54% of L’Oréal. Madame Bettencourt and her family currently own 51% of Gesparal with 
Nestlé controlling the other 49%. So although Madame Bettencourt’s ownership of L’Oréal has 
been reduced, she still has over twenty five per cent of a far larger company. Effectively, 
through the link with Nestlé, Gesparal can ensure that no corporate predator takes over L’Oréal. 
The French business magazine, Le Nouvel Economiste, valued Madame Bettencourt’s fortune 
at 13.7 billion euro in 2002 making her the richest person in France.   29
   It was not always plain sailing for L’Oréal. In the early 1950s it was regarded as a poor credit 
risk for long-term lending and the difficulty the company had borrowing from the banking 
system at this stage in its development may be observed from the caution that its bankers had 
lending it money in 1951 shortly after its takeover of Monsavon. At that time the conclusion of 
the Crédit Lyonnais’ analyst was:  
A slowing down of its sales could quickly place the Company in difficulties: this 
slowdown has already manifested itself for some of the Oréal lines (permanent waves, 
hair dyes, Ambre Solaire, shampoos, etc.). The Company has announced some cutback 
measures:  reductions in seasonal employments, and a cutback of 20% on the publicity 
budget but overhead costs have not been noticeably reduced, the Company contending 
that the two merged businesses cannot use the same sales representatives and that 
reductions in the advertising budget will take time. (CL, 5 July 1951)  
  The analyst was obviously intrigued as to how a company could boil and filter ‘tallow (60%), 
palm oil (20%), the residual elements of pork butcher’s meat (10%) and horse grease (10%)’ 
into soap and sell it as a quality product. He expressed misgivings as to the amount spent on 
advertising – a sine qua non of the cosmetics business - commenting on its ‘flashy publicity’ 
(‘une publicité tapageuse’). He recommended that the bank should be prudent and only lend to 
L’Oréal on a short term rather than a long-term basis. 
   Faced with conservative bankers who found it difficult to detect the growth of a business in 
this dubiously perceived area of ladies fashion (‘la mode féminine’) the Schueller/Bettencourt 
family concentrated to a significant extent on self-financing to meet its capital expenditure 
requirements. In May 1971 another analyst emphasised the extent of this self-financing and the 
company’s low level of indebtedness: 
For the period 1971-74 the group l’Oréal has an important investment programme 
amounting to a total of nearly 330 million francs. Its financing will be easily assured by 
the recent borrowing of 75 million francs and by self-financing (depreciation + 
retained profits 1970: about 81 million francs). No numerical increase in capital is 
expected, particularly because the level of indebtedness is only about 30 per cent of the 
group’s permanent capital. (CL Etude 9011/8, 26 Mai, 1971). 
    The reliance on self-financing provided L’Oréal with a strong balance sheet that enabled it to 
borrow long-term from the banking system to finance new acquisitions. By the 1970s ‘ladies 
fashion’ had become recognized as a very strong growth market and L’Oréal was well 




   Peugeot is the leading French constructor of automobiles. It is the second largest automobile 
company in Europe. In 2002 it employed over 190,000 workers and produced sales of 54.4 
billion euro. Peugeot, as a family controlled company, has had a long and fascinating history. 
The origin of the Peugeot manufacturing dynasty stretches back to the water mill construction 
business of Jean Pequignot Peugeot in the eighteenth century. An ability to adapt to new trends 
and technologies has always been the hallmark of this family. In 1815 the brothers Jean-Pierre 
and Jean Frédéric Peugeot teamed up with Jacques Maillard-Salins to run a steelworks and a 
saw blade factory in the area of Montbéliard. The establishment of the saw blade factory was 
helped by loans from Swiss bankers in Basle – see Lévy-Leboyer (1964, 349).  In 1842, Jean-
Frédéric invented the peppermill, still an essential element of the average kitchen. But this was 
only one of many ironmongery objects that the company specialized in. Saws, razors, sewing 
machines, clocks, stays and hoops for crinoline skirts etc were produced in the factory. Its 
ironmongery experience led to it producing the spokes of bicycle wheels and this in turn led to 
it becoming the biggest bicycle manufacturer in France. Bicycle production in turn led to 
automobile production. 
      In 1896 Armand Peugeot established the ‘Société Anonyme des Automobiles Peugeot’ 
despite the misgivings of some members of the family who refused to allow him to use the 
Peugeot ‘lion’ logo for a further fourteen years. The nominal capital of the company was 
800,000 francs divided into 800 shares of 1,000 francs each. 350 shares were granted to 
Armand Peugeot as a payment for ‘his contribution in bringing in the factory at Audincourt, the 
patents, cars in the process of production, leases, etc’ (CL November, 1908). In 1898 the 
nominal capital was increased to 2,400,000 francs through the creation of another 1,600 shares 
of 1,000 francs each.  
   This increase in capital was to help finance the establishment of a new factory at Lille.  By 
1900 Peugeot was producing the Peugeot Phaeton Type 28 with a speed of 35 kilometres an 
hour. Over its first ten years the company’s balance sheet showed losses alternating with profits 
as the technology of the automobile industry underwent sizeable transformations as the 
following table, compiled by a Crédit Lyonnais analyst, shows: 
Year     Francs 
1896/7       -53,000   31
1897/8      169,000 
1898/9      360,000 
1899/0      532,000 
1900/1                 -345,000 
1901/2            -1,001,000 
1902/3                 464,000 
1903/4       827,000 
1904/5       315,000 
1905/6              1,164,000 
1906/7              1,585,000 
        The large losses experienced between 1900-1902 were due to expenditure incurred on 
outdated models and heavy depreciation of the stock of spare parts for these models, as well as 
losses on the hiring of commercial vehicles. Over the twelve-year period from 1896 to 1907 the 
company made profits of 3,547,000 francs of which 2,104,000 francs (59%) were distributed as 
profits and 1,443,000 (4l%) put into reserves. From this it may be seen that from the very start 
Peugeot had a policy of re-investing a considerable part of its profits. So was Peugeot, at the 
turn of the twentieth century, a company that could be considered as a good lending 
opportunity for the bank. The analysts of the Crédit Lyonnais considered that the industrial and 
financial situation of the company was ‘good and solid’. They then qualified this by noting 
‘Nevertheless because of the risks inherent in the automobile industry arising from the intense 
competition both from French and international companies, the company is not guaranteed to 
produce regular profits in the future’ (CL, November 1908, p. 33). They were correct in this 
assessment because survival in the automobile industry at this time was difficult due to 
technological shocks ranging from changes in engine and chassis types to transformations in 
assembly line techniques. 
    The Peugeot family almost lost control of the company in the late 1920s due to financing 
problems. The Crédit Lyonnais blamed this policy on the arrival of three newcomers to the 
company between 1923-29 - Lucien Rosengart (1923-28) and Ricardo Gualino and Albert 
Oustric between 1928-30. Rosengart was first employed by the Peugeot family to assist in the 
financing of the company. His financing technique was to set up a separate company and to use 
it to borrow against the inventories held by Peugeot. He drew bills of exchange against these 
inventories and discounted them at the Banque de France, an activity that split the management 
of Peugeot during Rosengart’s five year employment at Peugeot – see Loubet (1999, 179). He   32
even briefly took over, as Managing Director from Robert Peugeot as a result of the latter’s 
long illness. Rosengart, described as someone who ‘passait pour avoir des idées originales en 
matière de construction automobile,’ was criticized by the Crédit Lyonnais for changing the 
company’s policy to one of expanding dividends at the expense of making sufficient provision 
for depreciation and increasing reserves. The analyst at the Crédit Lyonnais argued that rapid 
technological progress created the need for continuous re-tooling of factories suggesting that 
annual depreciations of 20 million francs should have been made rather than the 12 to 13 
million francs as practiced between 1925-26 to 1928-29 at a time when dividend payments had 
been annually increased from 10 to 21 million francs. Rosengart was forced to resign in 
January 1929. Peugeot, in need of financial assistance, linked up with Gualino and Oustric. 
This was to be a very short arrangement for the bankruptcy of the latter’s bank in 1930 led to 
considerable losses at Peugeot. The family took back control of the company appointing three 
out of the five board directors - Robert Peugeot, Jean-Pierre Peugeot and Jules Peugeot. 
      The brief association with financial controllers such as Rosengart and bankers such as 
Oustric, allied with the temporary move away from a policy of heavy reliance on self-
financing, created a near catastrophic result for the Peugeot family in the early 1930s. This 
experience appears to have hardened the family to returning to its tried and tested policy of 
investing through self-financing. Chadeau, describing how Peugeot emerged as the market 
leader between 1932-40 in France, focused on the self-financing strategy of the company: 
…Peugeot’s leadership decreed that each model launched had to be profitable in its 
own right, rather than as apart of a range. Whatever the rationale, the strategy made 
self-financing feasible and left family ownership intact. (1993, 195)     
      Loubet observed that up to 1963 it is clear that Peugeot gave priority to reducing 
indebtedness or not taking on debt, quite the contrary to the approach of state owned 
companies, Simca and Renault (Loubet, 1995: 81). By the 1970s Peugeot was sufficiently large 
for it to acquire 90 per cent of Citroen’s capital and then in 1977 it bought out Chrysler’s 
European operations. Notwithstanding the acquisitions and mergers of Peugeot, and the use of 
dynamic outsiders such as Jacques Calvet and Jean-Pierre Folz as CEOs, the family’s holding 
in Peugeot currently amounts to 27 per cent. Even more significantly the Peugeot family 
controls over 40% of the voting rights. The family’s wealth was estimated at 2.67 billion euro 
in 2002 by Le Nouvel Economiste.  
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Conclusion   
 
   This paper has attempted to show that historical phenomena have had a major impact in the 
determination of France’s corporate ownership structure. Corporate finance is generated  from 
three sources – banks, the capital market and self-financing. If we consider them as the three 
channels leading to corporate investment, then, history shows that two of these channels, the 
banks and the capital market, were subject to considerable upheaval rendering them inoperable 
as financing channels for a long period in France’s corporate history. The major financial 
shocks arose as a result of the rise and collapse of John Law’s Mississippi System and the 
hyper-inflationary experience generated by the assignats. These events traumatized the 
generation that experienced them. Furthermore, the strong oral tradition that emphasized the 
failures of Law and the assignats soured further generations towards financial innovation. 
Kindleberger (1989) emphasized the extent that these episodes traumatized the French: 
There [France] the trauma of the Mississippi Bubble and the collapse of John Law’s 
System slowed down the development of banking and the expansion of industry. 
Together with the collapse of the Directorate in the 1790s, it made the French neurotic, 
or even paranoid, about banking for years. (1989: 234)  
   The counterparts of this reaction against financial innovation was the continued recourse to 
notaires to fulfill a demi-banking role and the development of a strong specie holding mentality 
amongst the French. This in turn made it difficult for banks to develop fully even after the 
establishment of the big multi-branch banks, such as the Crédit Lyonnais and the Société 
Générale, in the 1860s. Faced with restricted access to the banks and capital markets, business 
entrepreneurs had to have recourse to a do it yourself approach, namely reliance on self-
financing as a method of growing their business.
2 This restricted access, along with the banks’ 
                                                 
2 The question may well be posed that if the thesis of a weak banking and capital market structure is accepted 
what happened to the performance of the French economy. Initial economic research by scholars at the 
Research Center in Entrepreneurial History at Harvard, encapsulated in  Landes  (1969), suggested that the 
French economy had been backward relative to the British economy during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Poor French entrepreneurship was put down as a causative factor to the inadequate performance. 
More recent quantitative research initiated by the Institut de Science Economique Appliquée, under the 
direction of Jean Marczewski, has challenged this retardationist approach and provided strong evidence that 
this was not the case – for a review of this literature see Cameron and Freedeman (1983). If  this latter 
revionism is accepted then it may be argued that, because the French economy on average performed 
satisfactorily relative to its neighbours, the thesis that the banking and capital market structures were weak 
does not hold up.  Two alternative interpretations may arise (1) the French economy would have produced 
even greater economic growth if it had been underpinned by a strong financial sector. There is a growing 
literature showing the way in which the financial sector has assisted total factor productivity –  see, for 
example, Levine (1997) and Beck et al (2000). This literature would imply that if France had possessed a   34
apparent willingness to invest outside France, may also have been responsible for having 
generated an anti-banking sentiment on the part of French entrepreneurs. This anti-banking 
sentiment was forcibly advanced by Louis Renault, the founder of Renault, when he stated: 
Bankers are not philantrophists, they are money merchants and one should as often as 
possible not have any business with them. (Loubet, n.d.) 
Self-financing in turn enabled these entrepreneurs and their descendants to retain sizeable 
shareholdings in the family controlled business. Hence, from an historical perspective, it is not 
surprising to see French families owning such a large proportion of French corporations. 
Examples of this reliance on self-financing drawn from the experiences of the Michelin, 
Bettencourt/Schueller, and Peugeot families have been shown above. Furthermore this style of 
ownership ties in with the French mentality that asset ownership is an inter-generational 
phenomenon. The objective of holding wealth is to pass on to the next generation of the family 
assets that, hopefully, have risen in value.  
      Though this does not square with the Berle and Means (1932) approach as to the way 
corporations should be owned and controlled it does not necessarily mean that the French 
owned corporations are less efficient than their American counterparts. Family control can 
enable companies to take long term investment decisions without all the emphasis of short-
termism that widely diffused stock market ownership may necessitate. While Landes (1949, 
1969) was of the view that France was hobbled by family control of companies there is a strong 
counter argument to make that many of these family owned companies provided France with 
dynamic leadership promoting rather than retarding French economic activity.  
   This paper has emphasized the importance of history in the evolution of France’s corporate 
ownership structure. There are of course other more recent elements that help explain the high 
degree of concentration of corporate ownership by families in France. The absence of funded 
pension schemes has led to a far lower profile by pension funds and assurance companies in the 
French stock market. In 1997 pension funds and assurance companies constituted 49% of 
household savings in the United Kingdom and 30% in the United States as against 18% in 
France. Recent industrial unrest in France has been exactly about this issue with trade unions 
arguing that it is the state that should provide long and generous pensions on a pay-as-you-go 
basis. The continuation of this approach to pensions implies, given the demographic structure, 
                                                                                                                                                     
more sophisticated financial sector between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries that it would have achieved 
an even higher rate of growth than that ascribed to it by economic historians; (2) the reliance on self-financing 
enabled entrepreneurs to make long-term investment decisions free from the constraints of  a capital market 
emphasising short term results.       35
that the percentage of GDP devoted to retirement payments will rise from 12 per cent at present 
to 16 per cent by 2040.The consequences of this for taxation are probably unsustainable in the 
long run. If so, there will be increasing emphasis on funded pension schemes which will 
produce greater investment by pension funds and assurance companies in the French stock 
market. 
   Changes in governments in France produced waves of nationalizations between 1945 and 
1982. More recently this process has been reversed. The privatizations of the Chirac 
government in the 1980s increased the number of French shareholders from 1.7 million in 1982 
to 6.2 million in 1987 (Goldstein, 1996, 463).   
      The different corporate ownership structure in France, and, indeed, in many continental 
European countries, to that of the Anglo-American model raises the issue as to why there has 
not been a universalist convergence to the latter.  Has it been due to the inadequate corporate 
governance in the civil versus the common law countries as La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) have 
stressed? This paper has tried to show that there have been strong historical factors at work that 
help explain France’s current corporate ownership structure. One of these factors has been the 
way financial collapses, such as the Mississippi System, and the assignats have fashioned 
attitudes towards money, banks, credit and financial innovation – the major props of corporate 
finance. The Mississippi System – the biggest attempt at corporate re-structuring in the 
eighteenth century - and the assignats both aimed to remove the Midas fixation on gold in 
France and replace specie with banknotes and credit. Ironically, their respective failures 
actually reinforced the Midas fixation. The result of this was that financial innovation was 
frowned upon and the banking sector, from 1720 until the 1930s, was only allowed to grow 
within the constraints of a specie based monetary system. France’s historical experience 
generated opposition to external finance that in turn led to internal finance and concentrated 
ownership. Another one of the historical factors highlighted in this paper is the different 
approach to inheritance. In France even if one wanted to disinherit the ‘idiot heir’ one could not 
do so. All one can do is to educate him/her. The French ‘grandes écoles’ have been intensively 
used by the large corporate owning families to ensure that their successors are capable to 
handling the ‘patrimoine’ in an appropriate manner. The continued participation of the 
Michelins and Peugeots in the management of the companies created by their ancestors in the 
nineteenth century shows the strength of the French family model.    
   Family control of companies is not necessarily the bad thing that some Anglo-American 
commentators make it out to be. Family ownership may prevent new blood coming into a   36
company but sometimes the old blood is able to take a longer term perspective and to 
concentrate more resources on research and development than a young corporate raider whose 
leitmotif may be one of asset stripping at the expense of all that has been historically built up by 
a company. Evidence to support this view for France has recently emerged in Sraer and 
Thesmar’s paper (2004). Furthermore for the U.S. Anderson and Reeb (2003) have shown that 
family owned owned companies in the S & P 500 had a 6.65% better return on assets and that 
their assets and were valued 10% higher by the stock market in the U.S. Keeping it in the 
family may be good for not just the insiders but also outsider shareholders.   
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